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ABSTRACT: The concept of resilience acquired academic momentum and pervaded a growing 
number of crosscutting disciplines along the second half of the twentieth century. Drawing on its 
epistemological flexibility, its implicit redefinition of agency and the inclusion of the parameters of 
uncertainty and the inevitability of crisis in its very core, it did not take long until the fields of Inter-
national Relations and foreign policy-making paid thorough attention to its potential outreach and 
operationalization. Nor it is surprising that the European Union, imbued in a comprehensive review 
of its external strategy’s flaws and shortages, embraced the term as a means to underpin the para-
digmatic bridge laid by the guidance of principled pragmatism. Yet, resilience-fostering can point at 
states or societies, and the authoritarian nature of Egypt’s regime compels to prioritize the latter, in 
accordance to EU’s democratic stance. The current paper will offer a brief review of EU foreign-po-
licy approaches vis-à-vis Egypt, an European Neighbourhood Policy/Instrument walkthrough and it 
will aim at putting in quantitative terms what kind of resilience is the Union placing at the forefront. 
To conclude, a series of recommendations will be formulated for EU resilience strategy.
KEYWORDS: state/societal resilience, ENP, MENA, stability-democracy dilemma, 
authoritarianism, civil society, policy outputs, Annual Action Programmes.
LA UNIÓN EUROPEA Y EL VECINO EGIPCIO: EVALUANDO LA CARACTERIZACIÓN 
DE LA RESILIENCIA COMO PRIORIDAD DE ACCIÓN EXTERIOR
RESUMEN: El concepto de resiliencia captó el interés de la academia y penetró en un número 
progresivo y transversal de disciplinas a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Apoyándose 
sobre la flexibilidad epistemológica, la redefinición implícita de la agencia y la inclusión de los 
parámetros de incertidumbre e inevitabilidad de la crisis en su seno, las áreas de Relaciones Inter-
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for Research and Islamic Studies (KSA) and Master’s in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at 
University Carlos III of  Madrid (Spain). ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3522-
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nacionales y diseño de política exterior no tardaron en posar su atención sobre su alcance y opera-
cionalización. Tampoco es de extrañar que la Unión Europea, imbuida en una revisión integral de 
los defectos y carestías de su estrategia exterior, acogiera el término con afán de apuntalar el puente 
paradigmático que tiende el llamado pragmatismo con principios. Ahora bien, la promoción de la 
resiliencia puede apuntar a los estados o a las sociedades, y en este sentido, de acuerdo con la lógica 
pro-democrática de la UE, la naturaleza autoritaria del régimen de Egipto exigiría una priorización 
de aquella segunda dimensión. Este artículo pretende ofrecer un repaso ligero de los enfoques de 
política exterior de la Unión vis-à-vis Egipto, una guía a lo largo de la Política (o Instrumento) 
Europea de Vecindad, y procurará resolver en términos cuantitativos qué tipo de resiliencia sitúa la 
Unión en primera línea. A modo de conclusión, se ordenará una serie de recomendaciones para la 
estrategia de resiliencia de la UE.
PALABRAS CLAVE: resiliencia estatal/social, PEV, MENA, dilema estabilidad-democracia, au-
toritarismo, sociedad civil, productos de política, Programas de Acción Anual. 
L’UNION EUROPÉENNE ET LE VOISIN ÉGYPTIEN: ÉVALUER LA 
CARACTÉRISATION DE LA RÉSILIENCE EN TANT QUE PRIORITÉ DE L’ACTION 
EXTÉRIEURE
RESUME: Le concept de résilience a acquis  une dynamique académique et a imprégné un nom-
bre de disciplines transversales le long de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle.  S’appuyant sur son la 
flexibilité épistémologique, sa redéfinition implicite d’agence et l’inclusion des paramètres de l’in-
certitude et l’inévitabilité de la crise,  les domaines des Relations Internationales et de la politique 
étrangère n’ont pas tardé à se concentrer sur son champ d’application et son opérationnalisation. Il 
n’est pas surprenant non plus que l’Union européenne, chargée d’un examen approfondi des défauts 
et des carences de sa stratégie étrangère, ait adopté ce terme dans le but de soutenir le pont paradig-
matique que l’on appelle généralement pragmatisme avec principes. Pourtant, le renforcement de 
la résilience peut pointer vers des États ou des sociétés, et la nature autoritaire du régime égyptien 
oblige à donner la priorité à ces derniers, conformément à la position démocratique de l’UE.
Le présent document proposera un aperçu des approches dynamiques vis-à-vis de l’Égypte, une 
procédure pas à pas pour la politique européenne de voisinage et visera à mettre en termes quantita-
tifs le type de résilience que l’Union place au premier plan. Pour conclure, une série de recomman-
dations sera formulée pour la stratégie de résilience de l’UE.
MOTS-CLES: résilience étatique/sociale, PEV, MENA, dilemme stabilité-démocratie, autoritaris-
me, societé civile, résultats politiques, Programmes d’Action Annuels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), signed by the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and drafted by her 
close advisor Nathalie Tocci, seated the strategic priority of  resilience at the 
core of  EU foreign policy, notwithstanding it had already been introduced as 
a purposeful tenet in the 2015 Reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). Feeding on its first steps within psychology studies and its later 
transposition to the field of  environmental policy, an overarching definition 
of  resilience must comprise the basic elements introduced by Haris AlibAsic, 
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who deems resilience as “the capacity and ability of  organizational systems 
to recover from shocks and disasters and to continue to thrive during and 
after disasters”2. The term ‘disaster’ can be easily replaced by that of  ‘crisis’, 
leading to the EUGS’ formula: “the ability of  states and societies to reform, 
thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”3.
On one hand, this conceptualization falls in line with the challenging equi-
librium between the reminder that stability is no substitute for sustainability 
–what EU circles could label, among different aspects, as ‘good governance’, 
or plain democracy- and the need to avoid preaching4, that is to say, while ac-
knowledging the limits to EU policies on the ground. On the other, it poses a 
clear distinction, although not always readily applicable to the highly complex 
realities of  MENA, between those potential recipients of  the resilience-dri-
ven efforts: states and societies. And in a rhetorically subtle, yet informative 
way, the EUGS delineates where the ideal preference lies. Almost invariably at 
the centre of  the community’s system of  beliefs, whose relevance also derives 
from they being policy drivers and sources of  credibility, authoritarian states 
are considered inherently fragile in the long term, while they can boost their 
resilience “when societies feel they are becoming better off  and have hope 
in the future”5. Adding the assumption that major improvements demand 
a home-grown character to the resilience vocabulary, non-state actors or civil 
society would come to represent the preferential targets when addressing its 
neighbourhood.
Under this logic, democratic environments are better suited for absorbing 
the negative effects of  a shocking event, hence authoritarian states, apart 
from being unstable and threatening long-term security, are less accountable 
in the advancement of  human rights and democratisation, thus represent an 
obstacle to EU resilience by themselves. Andrea Dessì attempts to clarify 
EUGS provisions and supply with strategic guidance by concluding that ‘au-
2 AlibAsic, H., “Ethics of  Resiliency in Crisis Management”, In A. FArAzmAnd (ed.), Global 
Encyclopedia of  Public Administration, Public Policy and Governance, Springer International Publi-
shing, 2018, pp. 1.
3 council oF the eu, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the 
EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p.23.
4 tocci, N., Framing the EU Global Strategy. Rome, Italy: Springer International Publishing, 
2017.
5 council oF the eu, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe... cit., p. 25.
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thoritarian resilience’, despite embodying the customary practice, would be a 
backlash for EU interests, therefore “greater resources and focus should be 
placed on the societal dimension”6.
The present research paper will try to answer, finding the channel for the 
bulk of  the relations between the EU as a whole and Egypt in the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the question of: what kind of  resilience 
is the EU prioritising vis-à-vis Egypt? State or society resilience?. In doing so, 
the author will frame his assessment in order to verify whether the European 
Union is prioritizing a state-resilience approach vis-à-vis Egypt, thus beco-
ming our hypothetical statement.
II. METHODOLOGY
This case study will focus on the main instrument the European Union 
has for accomplishing its foreign policy objectives regarding Egypt, which, 
without undermining its own casuistry, depicts an exemplary partner for 
analysing and weighing the set of  understandings and tools and their un-
derlying concerns that we may find within the context of  the so called Sou-
thern Neighbourhood, the territorial demarcation giving content to the EU’s 
strategy towards the Middle East and North Africa. The time frame for the 
research will encompass the EU-Egypt Annual Action Programmes under 
the ENP since 2014, once Abdelfatah Al Sisi formally becomes President 
of  the Republic and the political scene in Egypt enters a process of  stabi-
lisation, until the last Multiannual Programme that is expected to stretch its 
components until 2020. Through empirical research, and following OECD’s 
recommendation to ensure the quantitative nature7  when building policy ou-
tput indicators, this paper will itemise the financial allocations for the array of  
projects within those programmes, classify the monetary units by the criteria 
of  what kind of  resilience are they attempting to target and conclude where 
the priority in EU decision-making lies.
6 dessí, A., “Crisis and Breakdown: How Can the EU Foster Resilience in the Middle East 
and North Africa?”, IAI Working Papers, nº 17, 2017, p.16. Retrieved from: <https://www.iai.
it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1737.pdf>.
7 OECD., Slovak Republic: Better Coordination for Better Policies, Services and Results. Paris, France: 
OECD Publishing, 2015.
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Together with legal documents portraying their bilateral cooperation, EU 
official websites content and EU institutions’ releases, media documents, re-
ports by experts and various types of  academic works will provide the sour-
ces for conducting the current research. The first section, covering the li-
terature review, will be divided in a number of  subsections dealing briefly 
with the concept of  resilience and its state and societal dimensions at the 
EU level; the evolution and main aspects of  the ENP and ENI, particularly 
in their form in regards to Egypt; and the salient foreign policy approach to 
this country materialising the fault line between Maghreb and Mashreq, also 
paying attention to very specific issues at the domestic level that might help 
to explain EU behavioural patterns. Then the second section will offer the 
quantitative analysis of  policy outputs around state and society resilience, 
observing and categorising amounts, stakeholders and recipients. In order 
to stress the potential discordances between rhetoric and practice, a short 
third section will comment upon two different mechanisms out of  the Action 
Programmes that have the potential to foster respective kinds of  resilience: 
Member States’ arms sales to Egypt and the EC Civil Society Facility. Lastly, 
a series of  recommendations for EU resilience strategy will be put in place. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. RESILIENCE IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL STRATEGY
The European Union strategic tenets and premises face a ream of  poten-
tial and serious contradictions that, while offering a necessary dose of  ambi-
guity for a wider room for manoeuvre, poses some difficulty in foreign policy 
design. For instance, it is asserted that “our enduring power of  attraction can 
spur transformation in these countries”8, however, it is equally accepted that 
can only happen with those countries wishing to develop stronger relations 
with the EU. Here, the notion of  principled pragmatism finds its adequate 
fit, stemming from “a realistic assessment of  the strategic environment as 
from an idealistic aspiration to advance to a better world”9. In this sense, the 
components of  the concept of  resilience become the bridge for both pur-
8 council oF the eu, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe... cit., p. 9.
9 Ibid, p. 16.
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poses, being “an ingredient for stability, good governance and prosperity”10, 
although dropping the emphasis on democratisation of  the neighbourhood11. 
The assiduously mentioned key principles for the unified foreign poli-
cy –differentiated approach, flexibility, tailor-made policies, endorsement of  
home-grown initiatives, greater local ownership– reverberate the perception 
of  an international stage, specifically in MENA, characterised by a growing 
complexity, a rampant dynamism12, where the EU counts with diminishing 
prospects for fulfilling its will and sees itself  surrounded by an arc of  insta-
bility13. All those tenets can be integrated into the logic of  resilience, whose 
strength resides in its measured commitment and the acknowledgement of  
the own weaknesses and the existence of  other worldviews. In sum, a fresh 
intake of  realpolitik.
For its detractors, the novel concept implies “stability for authoritarian re-
gimes and supporting reforms in the countries the governments of  which are 
eager to accommodate them”14. For its advocates, it means drafting feasible 
goals and choosing a non-linear, long-term path through which neighbouring 
entities can build capacities for improvement and adaptation. The former 
stance may miss that a resilience-driven foreign policy decision entails qualif-
ying “the resilience of  whom (or what) and resilience to whom (or what)”15. 
In other words, EU external action towards its southern partners will have to 
deem the recipients’ state or –very often, and– societal character, “not only 
to prevent EU policy from inadvertently strengthening ‘authoritarian resilien-
10 dessí, A., “Crisis and Breakdown: How Can the EU... cit.”, p. 4.
11 GAhmArAnovA, A., “The Resilience Paradigm in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the 
European Neighbourhood and Democratization”, Around the Caspian, 2018. Retrieved from: 
<http://caspianet.eu/2018/11/29/the-resilience-paradigm-in-the-2016-eu-global-strategy-
the-european-neighbourhood-and-democratisation/>.
12 soler i lechA, E. and tocci, N., “Implications of  the EU Global Strategy for the Middle 
East and North Africa”, MENARA Future Notes, Nº1, 2016. Retrieved from: <https://www.
iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/implications-eu-global-strategy-middle-east-and-north-africa>.
13 tocci, N., “The European Union in a changing global environment: a more connected, 
contested and complex world”, EEAS Working Paper, 2015. 
14 GAhmArAnovA, A., “The Resilience Paradigm in the 2016... cit.”
15 colombo, S. and ntousAs, V., “Introduction Framing Resilience: A New Pathway For 
EU-MENA Relations”, In s. colombo, A, dessí and V. ntousAs (eds.), The EU, Resilience 
and the MENA region, Brussels, Belgium: Foundation for European Progressive Studies and 
Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017, pp.11-28.
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ce’, [...] but also in order to ensure that its policies are based on the largest 
possible pool of  viewpoint and concerns”16, specially relevant in a region 
where security and economic problems find a great deal of  association with 
deep crises of  governance and the dividing line between both targets of  resi-
lience is often blurred. In addition, a source of  containment for the Union’s 
ambitions is to be found in the wariness these authoritarian regimes have in 
relation to the European commitment to the promotion of  values and third 
actors and its indirect weakening effect upon the regimes’ survival, leading to 
the rationale that, for the engagement to be somehow successful, its credibi-
lity as a reliable partner must remain rather intact.
Regarding state resilience, it will make reference to the capacity of  the 
state17, that is to say, virtually every policy targeting the governmental institu-
tions, administration, public firms and services. In contrast, society resilience 
will cover non-state actors, encompassing civil society, “cultural organisations, 
religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders”18, which 
could be further developed into student organisations, women’s groups or 
worker unions.
2. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND INSTRUMENT
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched in 1995, opened 
the window for the first modest steps in the institutionalization of  EU-Egypt 
bilateral relations, as exemplified by the 2001 Association Agreement, still 
in effect. Yet, the scope for such a non-binding cooperation soon proved 
insufficient in the light of  rapidly mounting changes that urged the EU to 
secure a broader leverage across the sea, and to the east to Central Asia: the 
media-called ‘big bang’ enlargement abruptly moved the external borders, 
posing emerging challenges amid potential instability spillovers and the uns-
teady dynamics stemming from fault lines separating political spaces vastly 
differentiated in socioeconomic and security terms; the changing geostrategic 
environment, namely the failure of  the Middle East Peace Process, the ‘War 
on Terror’ and U.S. invasions in the region19; and the disappointing outcomes 
16 dessí, A., “Crisis and Breakdown: How Can the EU... cit.”, p. 16.
17 colombo, S. and ntousAs, V., “Introduction Framing Resilience... cit.”
18 council oF the eu, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe... cit., p. 27.
19 stivAtchis, Y., “The EU and the Middle East: The European Neighbourhood Policy”. In 
Y. stivAtchis (ed.), Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 2018, pp. 110-127, .
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of  the EMP framework, which did not prevent from growing domestic isla-
mophobia and irregular migration.
For all the aforementioned, the year 2004 gave birth to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and, in 2007, the first EU-Egypt Action Plan entered 
into force, coinciding with the implementation of  the European Neighbour-
hood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), “the main financial instrument to 
fund cooperation programmes with the Neighbourhood partner countries 
(and committing) 1€ billion for the period 2007-2013”20 to Egypt. Four years 
later, the Arab uprisings and the subsequent excessive optimism led to the 
novelty of  an incentive-based approach, the ‘more for more’ principle, “whereby 
efforts by partner countries were to be rewarded with additional financial and 
other support”21. In Egypt’s case, the debate around the drivers plunging, 
first Hosni Mubarak’s ouster and later Muhammad Morsi’s in 2013, still dis-
cusses the triggering effect of  regional mobilisation networks and the role 
played by external sponsors as much as it cannot be fully grasped without 
stressing internal developments in place. For some, popular discontent pri-
marily stemmed from a lack of  social justice, economic opportunities and a 
proper administration beyond coercive and extractive means. Mubarak’s regi-
me depicted a continuity with Perlmutter’s characterization of  the ‘praetorian 
state’22. Morsi’s last months were plagued with service shortages and upward 
prices and unemployment, despite being democratically elected in rather free 
polls and championing a reformist Islamist agenda that, in principle, might 
be appealing for a conservative society like Egypt. Yet, critics in the opposi-
tion feared the President’s widening powers and, even if  Islamization gathers 
supporters, those aspirations do not systematically equate to the Muslim Bro-
therhood23. For others, the sudden opening of  the political space reignited 
the competition among visions over the nature and role of  the state that can 
be traced back to the irruption of  modern governance and the abrogation of  
20 europeAn commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Egypt, 
2018.
21 europeAn externAl Action service, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 2016.
22 perlmutter, A. “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of  
Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities”, Comparative Politics, vol. 1 (3), 1969, pp. 382-
404.
23 mccArthy, A. “Shari’a after Morsi: Egypt revolted against inept governance, not Islamic 
supremacism”, National Review, vol.65(14), 2013..
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the Ottoman Caliphate. In Shadi Hamid’s understanding, liberalism is only 
neutral for those who are already liberals24, and the fact is democracy would 
not smoothly come hand-in-hand with the former. With lessening support 
abroad and intensifying protests at home, the army’s coup d’état initiated a 
process of  stabilisation, crashing the dissidence and restructuration of  the 
state grip over the country. The European Union did not condemn the go-
vernment’s toppling, instead fixed its position to the return to the democratic 
process and the rejection of  the use of  violence25.
In sum, under the ‘more for more’ principle, turning out to be poorly reflec-
ted upon, the top-down mentality and ‘one size fits all’ motto towards politi-
cal and economic reform did not manage to produce satisfactory results. The 
unexpected demographic movements seeking asylum in Europe evidenced 
the need for a new turn.
Learning from failure, a strategic shift calls for new labels. The 2015 Re-
viewed ENP and the ENI did not renounce to imbue a resemblance of  the 
traditional logic of  appropriateness –“the idea of  the ‘good life’ that is grounded 
in the identity of  a specific community”26–, sticking to the conceptualization 
of  the universal values as inherent EU interests, nonetheless, as explained 
before, a logic of  consequences –“deliberate consideration of  alternatives, 
assessment of  their outcomes and preference-driven choices”27– consolida-
ted within the communitarian vocabulary. Stabilisation –suggesting state re-
silience- becomes the core driver. The joint priorities for cooperation under 
ENP maintain the goal of  good governance and human rights but it will be 
framed by economic development and stabilisation, security and migration 
and mobility28, the last two pointing at a heavy weight for governmental re-
silience, and only after conceiving a complementary role for civil society’s 
24 hAmid, S., Islamic Exceptionalism: How the struggle over Islam is reshaping the world, St. Martin 
Press, New York, 2016.
25 BBC, “World reaction to the ousting of  Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi”, BBC News, July 4, 
2013.
26 sjursen, H. and smith, K., Justifying EU foreign policy: the logics underpinning EU enlar-
gement. In B. tornA and T. christiAnsen (eds.), Rethinking European Union foreign policy, pp. 
126-142, 2004, p.127.
27 schulz, M., “Logic of  Consequences and Logic of  Appropriateness”. In M. AuGier and 
D. teece (eds.), Palgrave Encyclopedia of  Strategic Management, 2014, pp. 1-17, p.2.
28 europeAn commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: What is it?, 2016.
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involvement. On the ground, Arab non-state actors have also tended to per-
ceive EU’s stance as biased in favour of  arbitrarily selected organisations, 
adding to an insufficient financial support, undue bureaucratic hurdles and 
very slow disbursement29.
For the period 2014-2020, the ENI is expected to allocate over 15€ billion 
to the Neighbourhood30. The bulk of  it would be assumed to be channelled 
through the Annual Action Programmes, later replaced by the multiannual 
frameworks -since 2017-, which aim to provide cohesion and continuity to 
the concrete policies and facilitate their evaluation. According to the EC, 
out of  that figure approximately 1€ billion corresponds to cooperation with 
Egypt31. Quite interestingly, as we will see, the numbers codified within the 
Action Programmes do not even get close to the former, suggesting that the 
Single Support Framework might not be that ‘single’ after all. Unfortunately, 
the review of  those missing components falls out the scope of  this research, 
coupled with the fact that some of  them remain out of  public disclosure.
3. EU APPROACH TO EGYPT
Whether digging into the bilateral agreements constituting the legal struc-
ture for their cooperation, assessment reports released by EU institutions or 
independent academic diagnosis, conclusions tend to converge to very similar 
findings and dilemmas, suggesting the general lines of  the joint strategy vis-
à-vis Egypt have consistently prevailed, in spite of  an entirely new rhetorical 
repertoire and innovative outputs that proved lacking, or were silently with-
drawn: the stability of  now, rather than the one of  tomorrow, pays worthy. 
The security-stability nexus requires a close engagement with the state, even 
if  it implies overlooking the regime’s behaviour or whether they have virtua-
lly fused in one, but Egypt’s meaning for the EU has other bifurcations, yet 
mostly leading to the state. As commented on a policy paper requested by 
one of  the parliamentary committees, Egypt implies “the need to preserve 
political stability of  many authoritarian regimes because of  their modera-
te foreign policy outlook, their strategic and geopolitical significance, their 
cooperation with many countries in fighting terrorism and limiting illegal mi-
gration, and because of  the EU’s need to secure energy routes from North 
29 stivAtchis, Y., “The EU and the Middle East: The European... cit.”
30 europeAn externAl Action service, European Neighbourhood Policy... cit.
31 europeAn commission, European Neighbourhood Policy... cit.
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Africa and keep oil and gas prices stable”32. Beyond this, in line with the 
resilience priority, the Union has become aware of  a previously unsuspected 
anchorage of  the regional nation-states, as the litmus test brought about by 
the Arab uprisings was not followed by the Sykes-Picot map’s disruption, in 
fact, the initial weakening of  their internal sovereignty has not been neces-
sarily matched with the same levels of  erosion at their external dimension33, 
making it even more compelling to deal with the state structures struggling 
for survival, at the expense of  a civil society clutter without enough prospects 
for success or trustworthiness.
The Partnership Priorities for 2017-2020 show the uneasy concessions 
the EU has to make to Sisi’s government in order to guard its security and 
economic concerns and try to advance a meaningful compliance in return. 
For example, the opening paragraphs underline a “shared commitment to 
the universal values of  democracy, the rule of  law and the respect for human 
rights”34. The document refers to the sustainability of  the economy and social 
development, strengthening their foreign policy ties, enhancing domestic sta-
bility, security,  terrorism and migration management as the central pillars in 
the forthcoming years. To address these issues, the agreement systematically 
fingers at the public role, winks at the private sector participation in the eco-
nomy, in accordance to the Union’s traditional business approach, and only in 
the end both parties confirm to agree in the involvement of  civil society as a 
“potent contributor”35.
The cosmetic changes in EU’s stance might not be relinquished to be 
just so if, without undermining the common geopolitical interests placed in 
Egypt and the specific reinforced importance for some Member States, as the 
former being the world’s third largest arms importer depicts36, in the current 
internal context, it was not that difficult to “challenge the entrenched posi-
32 GhAFAr, A.A., “A stable Egypt for a stable region: Socio-economic challenges and pros-
pects”, EP Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Paper, 2018, p.32.
33 soler i lechA, e., del sArto, r. mAlmviG, h., “Interregnum: The Regional Order in the 
Middle East and North Africa After 2011”, MENARA Final Reports, 1, 2019, p.13.
34 council oF the eu, Communication to the Delegations on the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 
2017-2020, 2017, p.1.
35 Ibid., p. 9
36 mAGed, M., “SIPRI: Egypt occupies 3rd position among world’s 25 largest arms impor-
ters”, Egypt Independent, 2019.
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tions by the Government”37. Similarly to other MENA countries, state and 
regime are growingly interdependent, the public sector supplies the biggest 
percentage of  employment, the army is the key to the government and the so 
called ‘Arab social contract’ has not preceded a feasible substitute. But a dis-
tinctive feature curbs out the opportunities to pursue society resilience under 
the ENP in Egypt: the recent and ongoing development of  one of  the most 
restrictive NGO laws in the world, the multilayered mechanisms for contro-
lling financing and the pervasive penetration of  third competitors. Enacted 
on 29th May 2017, the new ‘NGO law’ makes “human rights work virtually 
impossible”38, the National Regulatory Agency monitors funds, goals, opera-
tions and recipients, opinion polls under supervision are banned and punitive 
measures are extremely severe. Moreover, international donors interested in 
Egypt and in securing the regime’s favour have heavily diversified during the 
last years. China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf  states have sidelined the North 
American and European leverages and fragmented the range of  options for 
a government looking for the best bargain. While countries like Saudi Arabia, 
UAE and Kuwait have managed to direct around 12 billion USD right after 
the 2014 coup39, EU’s contribution is way smaller, time-consuming in terms 
of  gaining access and subjected to stronger scrutiny and demand for reform. 
Regarding the ENP, and in particular towards Egypt, its present, more vi-
sible deficiencies do not differ vastly from those that can be equally traceable 
in the Common and Foreign Security Policy. The strategic bonds with a num-
ber of  major Member States renders the Egyptian state to play them to com-
pete against each other, collect the benefits and limit the scope for a common 
position. The insufficient consistency in EU outputs leads the organisation 
to usually appear to simply move from one crisis to the next one40. However, 
there is no doubt at certain aspects, such as perceiving Egypt as a first line of  
defence against illegal migration. Indeed, all these contingent factors have an 
impact on the chances for prioritising what kind of  resilience.
37 Gómez isA, F., “EU Promotion of  Deep Democracy in Egypt After the Arab Spring: A 
missed opportunity?”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, 33, 2017, p.27.
38 moonrises, J. and zenzzi, M., “In Search of  a More Efficient EU Approach to Human 
Rights: Civil Society and EU Strategies in Egypt”, MedReset Working Papers, 2018, p.10.
39 Gómez isA, F., “EU Promotion of  Deep Democracy in Egypt... cit”, p. 24.
40 GhAFAr, A.A., “A stable Egypt for a stable... cit.”, p. 34.
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IV. RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS:  
RESILIENCE IN THE ACTION PROGRAMMES
The current section of  the research departs from the assumption that 
the Annual –and Multiannual- Action Programmes (AAPs) agreed between 
the European Union and Egypt in the bilateral cooperation structure embo-
died by the Association Council constitute the legal roadmaps enabling the 
effective implementation of  the European Neighbourhood Instrument, at 
least of  its main components. At the same time, a variety of  complementary 
instruments, like the European Endowment for Democracy, the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Sustainable 
Energy Finance Facility, are understood as operating tools thus they absorb 
a significant yet minor amount of  the financial resources previewed for the 
ENP and ENI. This second array of  institutionalized mechanisms falls out 
the scope of  this research, arguing the EU-led calls for standardization and 
integration of  the legal frameworks pertaining the cooperation strategy into 
unitary documents –ie. Single Support Frameworks, since 2014– would have 
led to a lesser atomization of  the funds across projects. Nevertheless, when 
contrasting EU publicly available data at different levels, the discovery is quite 
surprising.
According to European Commission’s official online content, the ENI 
mounted for Egypt total numbers of  115€ million in 2014, 105€ million in 
2015, 100€ million in 2016, another 100€ million in 2017’s AAP and an es-
timated allocation between 432€-528€ million for the period 2017-202041. 
These statements genuinely contrast with the total amount of  272.4€ million 
for the period 2014-2020 that the current analysis sums by quantifying the 
financial resources codified within the same AAPs and their available annexes 
in the same EC’s official website. This gaping figures suggest, on one hand, 
the complementary mechanisms for conducting the ENI might be more pro-
minent than initially thought, on the other, a good deal of  funds are not made 
publicly available.
In order to assess whether the EU prioritises state or society resilience in 
the Action Programmes with Egypt, the author has examined the following 
documents: AAP 2014; AAP 2015 –four annexes–; AAP 2016 (Part I) –two 
annexes–; APP 2016 (Part II) and APP 2017 (Part I) –one annex–; AAP 
41 europeAn commission, European Neighbourhood Policy... cit.
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2017 (Part II) –two annexes–; Multiannual Action Programme 2018-2020 
–three annexes-. Through each of  them, the smaller components –concrete 
and operational projects–  have been revised to identify the exact individual 
amount of  monetary units that has been allocated to them and the key stake-
holders involved in the project. A particular actor is deemed to be a stake-
holder if  it is an important implementing agent within the project or if  it is 
a clearly established beneficiary. Then, depending on the objectives and the 
recipient(s) within each project, we categorise the types of  resilience that the 
policy output is aiming to strengthen into: a) state resilience; b) society resi-
lience; and c) both state and society resilience.
Firstly, the state resilience category encompasses the cases in which the 
stakeholders are the government, public administration in general, legal and 
judiciary branches, critical economic sectors run by the state and national po-
licy programmes. For its part, the society resilience category includes private 
companies –ie. Micro, Small and Medium Size Enterprises (MSMEs)-, civil 
society organisations (CSOs), disability organisations (DPOs) and NGOs in 
general.
A component is considered to apply for both state and society resilience 
in those cases where, in the light of  no further information available that 
might permit to break down the funds in a more precise way, one of  the con-
ditions set at the left column of  the following chart occurs in combination 
with one of  the conditions at the right column:
TABLE 1 – Both State and Societey Resilience
A) the state plays a prominent role in 
the management of  funds.
B) the state is a clear beneficiary.
1) at least, part of  the financial resources 
are managed by non-state entities.
2) public-private joint ventures.
3) non-state actors are clear beneficiaries.
Elaborated by the author.
A more detailed disaggregation of  the components is provided in the 
annex to this paper. The total amount of  272.4€ million for the period 2014-
2020 is divided in: a) 53.05€ million allocated to state resilience; b) 47.83€ mi-
llion set aside to society resilience; and c) 160.84€ million for both state and 
society resilience. The total figure for our time frame -272.4€ million- inclu-
des the derived costs from EU project evaluation, audit, communication and 
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visibility, whereas the other figures represent the net monetary units allocated 
to each resilience priority.
Notwithstanding the former, the key test for assessing the prioritisation is 
found in the ‘both state and society resilience’ category. Apart from accumu-
lating the biggest amount by far, it is illustrative to analyze what is the imple-
mentation rationale in relation to the triad: primary agent/second agent/end 
beneficiary. In most of  the cases, the public entities are the prevailing agents 
entitled with the supervision, approval, monitoring and implementation of  
the components; very often depict the direct beneficiaries; and sometimes 
are expected to receive an indirect positive impact by giving support to an 
output centrally targeting civil society. Meanwhile, non-state actors, althou-
gh in a well-framed manner, tend to be qualified as the end beneficiaries; 
sometimes have competences for a joint implementation with the state in 
egalitarian terms; but more often represent the secondary agent with partial 
instruments for enforcement under public supervision. The pervasiveness of  
the governmental actors has also to be considered in relation to the fact that 
Egypt possesses one of  the highest corruption rates in the world42. In sum, 
when a combination of  the two dimensions is advanced, the strength of  the 
public structures tends to go in the first place while society resilience is usua-
lly targeted as the last stop.
V. A BROADER VIEW: BILATERAL ARMS SALES AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY FACILITY
It has become clear to us that the state-resilience approach gathers more 
resources than the society-resilience goal along the various Action Program-
mes, nonetheless, is that an analogous pattern to the broader assemblage of  
EU foreign policy towards Egypt? The previous insights quoting different ex-
perts, which stress that security and economic interests have generally displa-
ced the promotion of  European standards, already suggest that stabilisation 
implies a closer engagement with the state for gaining its favour and ensuring 
its survival as a geopolitical asset. With the objective of  corroborating that 
assessment, we will take a very brief  glance at two other cooperation mecha-
nisms, one that could be deemed as a quintessential thrust for state resilience 
and the other a sole commitment to society resilience: bilateral arms sales to 
Egypt and the EC Civil Society Facility, respectively.
42 trAnspArency internAtionAl. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, [website content], 2018.
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Weapons trade with Egypt, although an exclusive competence by Member 
States, is relevant to our assessment because it is an indicator of  the disparity 
in the added value of  each kind of  resilience from a monetary perspective, 
but also as evidence for the real attachment to the so called ‘authoritarian 
resilience’ discourse. Between 2014 and 2018, Egypt more than doubled its 
arms imports and France and Germany prevailed among the five largest wea-
pon exporters43. Not being conclusive enough, in 2016, British sales to Egypt 
were estimated at 168€ million –more than the financial resources allocated 
to both state and society resilience for a six-years period–, France closed 
agreements for approximately 7.2€ billion, including dual-use technology, and 
Germany signed a billion-euro contract for two submarines in 201444. Backed 
with data produced by SIPRI, a policy brief  published last year concluded 
that France had surpassed the U.S. as the top provider of  arms to Egypt and 
Germany increased its sales by 205% in five years45.
For its part, the Civil Society Facility was created after the Arab uprisings 
in 2011 in an attempt to cooperate closer and more fruitfully with social 
actors in Egypt, hence mitigating the society’s long-standing absence from 
institutionalized political participation and, in some incipient understanding, 
enhance the country’s resilience by targeting capabilities for its population’s 
development and well-being. Nowadays, the newly enacted legal provisions 
and the overall regime’s reluctance have rendered the Facility almost non-en-
forceable in Egypt, however, even in 2011, “the financial envelop of  the fa-
cility was small to match with its stated objectives”46. The highest figure of  
900.000€47 in 2013 is nothing comparable to the resources devoted to state 
resilience.
43 mAGed, M., “SIPRI: Egypt occupies 3rd position among world’s... cit.” 
44 michou, H., “EU-Egypt Bilateral Relations: What Scope for Human Rights Advocacy?”, 
EuroMed Rights Working Paper, 2016.
45 TIMEP, “European Arms Sales to Egypt”, TIMEP Briefs, 2018.
46 hAssib, B., “EU Cooperation with Civil Society in Egypt: Assessing the New Neighbour-
hood Civil Society Facility”, paper presented at the International Conference on Social Scien-
ces and Humanities, at the Queen’s College, University of  Oxford, 2018, p.8
47 Ibid.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU RESILIENCE STRATEGY
For resilience –defined as the ability of  states and societies to reform, thus withs-
tanding and recovering from internal and external crises– to be met as the top, ove-
rarching priority it represents at the EU’s foreign policy core, while keeping 
in mind that the ‘authoritarian resilience’ model has already proven to be a 
double-edge instrument in a growingly unstable neighbourhood, a set of  re-
commendations needs to be introduced: 
– The European Union, even acknowledging the limits to its external ou-
treach, has to deploy a diversity of  efforts to diminish and deter the ongoing 
process of  personalization within Egyptian politics. In fact, since times of  
Gamal Abdel Nasser, reliance of  the political system’s sustainability upon 
one figure of  leadership has been an endemic pattern in the country. ‘Strong-
manship’ without a sufficiently consolidated underpinning structure collides 
with the long-term, crisis-containment endeavour that the concept of  resi-
lience poses, therefore, the EU must persevere in supporting the institutio-
nalization of  an administrative class attached to a bureaucratic model having 
some key resemblances with the Webberian one, that is to say, a class not 
easily subjected to co-optation, preferably depoliticized and constituting a 
firewall in the face of  the risk of  indistinctiveness between regime and state. 
– The credibility of  the EU as a supranational project with global aspirations 
is repeatedly questioned due to the far-fetched, often cosmetic operationa-
lization of  its pursued objectives and the recurrent dissonances in relation 
to its Member States’ behaviour. The geopolitical significance of  issues like 
energy, migration, terrorism or weapons trade for Europe is practically insur-
mountable, however, it is convenient to take into consideration that better 
prospects for securing those areas demand an adequate and decisive promo-
tion of  society resilience too.
– Despite the former statement, the Union also needs to be aware of  enga-
ging in cooperation with civil society segments without triggering or favou-
ring an unaffordable weakening of  the state that would dangerously conduct 
to its collapse. Capacity-building of  Egyptian social groups non-aligned nor 
co-opted by the regime would be desirable as long as a sufficiently high and 
double-checked benchmark for their democratic credential can be confirmed. 
The Egyptian state might be entitled to implement some sort of  supervision 
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in this sense, but the EU should make sure that its selection of  beneficia-
ries, monitoring and financial commitment is stronger. Political Islam should 
not be systematically discarded among the targeted groups, although the 
approach to it should be extremely thorough and it must ensure that the po-
tential beneficiary is not permeated by extremist discourses and components, 
even consolidating a comprehensive stopcock for the latter.
– Third competitors like China or Saudi Arabia are sidelining the EU as inter-
national donor, however, the Union remains the critical market for Egyptian 
goods and services and its major trading partner. The EU should remind this 
to Egypt’s government as a potential deterrence against letting these emer-
ging powers to penetrate into the national financial sustenance so easily, since 
an uninterrupted and profiting international trade is key for the regime’s le-
gitimacy.
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Annex I: Component Classification by Type of Resilience
EU-EGYPT Annual 
Action Programme
State resilience Society resilience Both state and socie-
ty resilience
Annual Action Program-
me 2014 / Annex ‘Ex-
panding Access to Educa-
tion and Protection for at 
Risk Children in Egypt’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
30 million 
Component 3 – Opera-
tionalising Child Law: 
-Amount: 9.5 million.
-Stakeholders: Gover-
nment and targeted 
administration.
Component 1 – Com-
munity Schools: 
-Amount: 13.4 million. 
-Stakeholders: Ministry 
of  Education, gover-
norates, local commu-
nities. 
Component 2 – Inclu-
sive-model schools: 
-Amount: 6.5 million. 
-Stakeholders: MoE 
and civil society. 
Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / 4 Annexes.
-EU budget cost: 63.4 
million. (included the 
4.4 millions financed 
by third entities, like 
Germany).
Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / Annex I ‘Citi-
zen Rights Project’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
11.4 million (10 million 
to the projects; 0.4 
by third parties and 1 
million for evaluation 
etc.) 
Component 1 – Su-
pport to the National 
Council for Human 
Rights (NCHR):
-Amount: 3.7 million.
-Stakeholders: NCHR.
Component 2 – In-
crease women partici-
pation in public life:
-Amount: 6.7 million.
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Council for Wo-
men, several Ministries, 
civil society, particular-
ly women.
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Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / Annex II 
‘Promoting Inclusive Eco-
nomic Growth in Egypt’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
16 million. (15 million 
+ 1 million for evalua-
tion and audit, contin-
gencies, etc.)
Component 2 – Grant 
Facility Schemes that 
will implement pro-
jects of  specific ad-
ded-value:
-Amount: 11 million.
-Stakeholders: private 
sector and civil society 
delivering support ser-
vices to MSMEs.
Component 1 – stren-
gthening the capacity 
of  stakeholders to im-
plement business cli-
mate…:
-Amount: 4 million.
-Stakeholders: seve-
ral Ministries, selected 
MSMEs, CSOs.
Annual Action Pro-
gramme 2015 /Annex 
III ‘Upgrading Informal 
Areas Infrastructure’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
28 million (27 million 
+ 1 million for evalua-
tion, etc.) 
Component 1:
-Amount: approx. 16.2 
million.
-Stakeholders: CSOs. 
Component 2: 
-Amount: approx. 10.8 
million.
-Stakeholders: Minis-
tries, administration 
and public companies 
, private contractors, 
residents.
Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / Annex IV 
‘Fostering Reforms in 
the Egyptian Renewable 
Energy and Water Sectors 
through Developing Capa-
city Building’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
8 million (7.4 million 
for the project and 0.6 
million for evaluation, 
etc.).
Component 1 – Stren-
gthening the capacities 
at central and local le-
vels in the water sector: 
-Amount: 4.6 million.
-Stakeholders: Ministry 
of  Water Resources 
and Irrigation.
Component 2 – Stren-
gthening the capacities 
at central and local le-
vels in the energy sec-
tor: 
-Amount: 2.8 million.
-Stakeholders: The 
Ministry of  Electricity 
and Renewable Energy.
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part I) / 2 
Annexes
- EU budget cost: 50 
million.
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Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part I) / An-
nex I ‘Advancing Women’s 
Rights in Egypt’
-EU budget cost: EUR 
10 million (+0.24 be-
ing financed by poten-
tial grant beneficiaries; 
9.34 million for project 
and 0.9 million for eva-
luation, etc.)
Component 1 – Su-
pport to the imple-
mentation of  the Na-
tional Action Plan for 
Female Genital Mutila-
tion abandonment: 
-Amount: 4.6 million.
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Population Coun-
cil, Ministry for Po-
pulation, Ministry of  
Health, Ministry of  
Justice.
Component 2 – Su-
pport women’s access 
to justice and legal em-
powerment:
-Amount: 4.74 million. 
-Stakeholders: Legal 
Aid Offices, Dispute 
Settlement Offices, 
women citizens.
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part I) / An-
nex II ‘National Drainage 
Programme III’
-EU budget cost: EUR 
40 million.
Component B – Te-
chnical assistance for 
capacity building for 
strengthening EPA-
DP’s and MRWI’s 
planning sector: 
-Amount: 2.65 million.
-Stakeholders: EPADP 
and MRWI.
Component A – In-
vestment, mainly 
through work con-
tracts, for increased 
efficiency of  drainage:
-Amount: 37 million.
-Stakeholders: EPA-
DP, MWRI, final user 
bodies (BCWUAs and 
private sector), farmers 
and their families.
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part II)  and 
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part I) / 1 
Annex
-EU budget cost: EUR 
20 million.
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Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part II) and 
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part I) / An-
nex I ‘EU Facility for 
Inclusive Growth and Job 
Creation’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
20 million (18.1 million 
for project and 1.9 
million for evaluation, 
etc.)
Component 2 – In-
creased potential of  
SMEs to add value in 
the economy and gene-
rate jobs:
-Amount: 3 million. 
-Stakeholders: repre-
sentative organizations 
of  businesses, acade-
mic research institutes 
and think tanks.
Component 1 – Im-
proved enabling envi-
ronment for business 
creation and economic 
development:
-Amount: 15.1 million. 
-Stakeholders: Egyp-
tian SMEs , Ministry 
of  Finance, the Egyp-
tian Tax Authority, 
Egyptian Customs Au-
thority, business asso-
ciations, NGOs, think 
tanks.
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part II) / 2 
Annexes
-EU budget cost: EUR 
33 million.
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part II) / An-
nex I ‘Support to Accoun-
tability and Democratic 
Governance’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
6 million (5.57 million 
for project and 0.25 
million for evaluation, 
etc.).
Component 1 – Su-
pport to fight against 
corruption: 
-Amount: 3.7 million. 
-Stakeholders: the Ad-
ministrative Control 
Authority, the Illicit 
Gains Department, the 
Egyptian Financial In-
telligence Unit, etc.
Component 2 – Su-
pport to the House of  
Representatives: 
-Amount: 2.05 million. 
-Stakeholders: The 
Egyptian Parliament 
and the Parliament 
Training Institute.
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Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part II) / An-
nex II ‘Support to Egypt’s 
National Population Stra-
tegy’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
27 million (26.6 million 
for project and 0.4 for 
visibility and evalua-
tion).
Component 3 – Popu-
lation governance:
-Amount: 2 million. 
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Population Council 
and public task-forces.
Component 1 – Im-
proved Family Plan-
ning supplies: 
-Amount: 16.6 million. 
-Stakeholders: Ministry 
of  Health, private en-
terprises, citizens.
Component 2 – In-
creased Family Plan-
ning demand: 
-Amount: 8 million. 
-Stakeholders: Ministry 
of  Health, CSOs.
Multi Annual Action 
Programme 2018-2020 / 
3 Annexes.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
76 million.
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Multi Annual Action 
Programme 2018-2020 / 
Annex I ‘EU4 Energy 
and Water’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
40 million (37.8 million 
for projects and 2,2 
million for evaluation, 
etc.).
Component 1 – En-
hance capacities at cen-
tral and local levels to 
efficient demand dri-
ven systems:
-Amount: 18.8 million.
-Stakeholders: Gover-
nment, financial or-
ganisations, investors, 
think tanks, user asso-
ciations.
Component 2 – Mo-
dernisation of  the wa-
ter and energy manage-
ment framework:
-Amount: 9.5 million.
-Stakeholders: pu-
blic-private partners-
hips, financial entities, 
administration.
Component 3 – Im-
proving the investment 
climate in the water 
and energy sectors:
-Amount: 9.5 million. 
-Stakeholders: the New 
and Renewable Energy 
Authority, the Water 
Regulatory Activity, 
private sector partici-
pation.
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Multi Annual Action 
Programme 2018-2020 
/ Annex II ‘EU for fair 
access to basic services’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
12 million (11.8 million 
for project and 0.2 
million for evaluation, 
etc.).
Component 1 – Su-
pport National spe-
cialized councils’ roles 
in inclusion and pro-
tection of  vulnerable 
groups: 
-Amount: 5.8 million. 
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Council for Child-
hood and Motherhood, 
National Council on 
Disability Affairs.
Component 2 – Targe-
ted support to vulne-
rable groups through 
civil society organisa-
tions: 
-Amount: 6 million.
-Stakeholders: CSOs, 
disability  organisa-
tions.
Multi Annual Action 
Programme 2018-2020 / 
Annex III ‘Complemen-
tary support for capacity 
development and civil so-
ciety’.
-EU budget cost: EUR 
24 million (23.3 million 
for project and 0.7 for 
evaluation, etc.).
Component 1 – Insti-
tutional capacity deve-
lopment:
-Amount: 11.65 mi-
llion. 
-Stakeholders: state 
structures.
Component 2 – Su-
pport to civil society:
-Amount: 11.65 mi-
llion. 
-Stakeholders: Big 
and small CSOs and 
NGOs.  
TOTALS
EUR 272.4 million 
(includes evaluation 
costs, etc.)
EUR 53.05 million EUR 47.83 million. EUR 160.84 million
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